Nigeria: A Challenging Case by Obe, Ayo
 1
PRELIMINARY DRAFT 
DO NOT CITE 
Nigeria: a challenging case 
by Ayo Obe 
Introduction 
 
‘In my village, Enugwu-Uku, whenever anything was to be done, the ekwe [a wooden 
drum] would be beaten by the designated person.  When it is beaten, people know that 
there is something to be done, and that people should come to the village square for 
information. To the extent that people were to be affected by actions to be taken, they 
had to be involved in the decision, there was nothing like just ordering them.’1 
 
 The idea that members of a community should be involved in informed decision-
making was not unknown in pre-colonial times as the above quote shows. But 19th century 
European colonizers brought a different approach – one of government secrecy – to ruling the 
peoples of the area that came to be known as Nigeria. 
 Dismantling that apparatus and making government open to even those whose pre-
colonial experience was less transparent is throwing up a number of challenges for today’s 
Nigerians. This chapter examines how different aspects of Nigeria’s history and political and 
socio-economic make-up encapsulate several of the factors that make attaining and sustaining 
a viable transparency regime particularly difficult in many countries. These range from the 
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effects of colonial cobbling together of numerous ethnic groups and a colonial heritage of 
secrecy, to the corrosive and corrupting effect of long years of unaccountable military 
dictatorship against a background of increasing economic dependence on income from 
petroleum resources.  It is in this challenging environment that a campaign for greater 
transparency is being waged. 
 
Background 
In many ways Nigeria – from arid deserts in the far north to petroleum-rich mangrove 
swamps on the Atlantic coast – is a microcosm of Africa itself. A former British colony with 
an inherited colonial administrative infrastructure, the country has several ethnic groups with 
diverse cultures, the competition amongst whom is barely contained within unwritten 
conventions dictated by realpolitik and written constitutional requirements to ‘reflect the 
federal character’ of the country in public and private life. Although it returned to civilian 
rule in May 1999, Nigeria has spent most of its post-independence years under military 
dictatorship. And since the early 1970s, an economy based on agriculture and an infant 
industrial sector has dwindled into one which depends on a petroleum industry (that is itself 
heavily dependent on overseas-based multinational oil corporations) for over 90% of its 
income.  
 Nigeria’s experience of access to information therefore illustrates a number of factors 
that have militated against, and may continue to militate against an orderly transition from a 
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system where governments hoard information to one where they release information, and 
where citizens make effective use of such information to challenge and to change government 
actions and policies. 
 
Military rule/Civilian rule: from idealistic revolution to corrupt kleptocracy 
One major factor that has shaped Nigeria’s access to information experience is the fact that 
29 of the country’s 44 years since independence have been spent under military dictatorship. 
Although most of Nigeria’s military rulers have been careful to describe military rule as ‘an 
aberration’, its length and depth has been such as to make civilian rule seem like the 
aberration. The signs are that having gained a hold on the country’s oil wealth, Nigeria’s 
soldiers will not easily relinquish their grip, as their shadow hangs over even the country’s 
most recent return to civilian rule. While Nigeria’s last but one military dictator died in the 
course of attempting to ‘succeed himself’ as a civilian president2, the winner of the 
presidential elections which heralded the return to civilian rule in 1999, General Olusegun 
Obasanjo, had previously ruled the country as a military dictator3.  The leading contestants in 
the 2003 presidential elections were both former military dictators4 and to cap it all, 
Nigerians are faced with the prospect of yet another former military dictator joining the 
contest for the 2007 presidential elections!5 
 The original coup-makers of 1966 may have had idealistic motives for what they 
termed their ‘revolution’, but by 1979 when Obasanjo handed power to elected civilians, easy 
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access to the wealth from the oil industry, shielded from public scrutiny by civil service 
traditions and military autocracy, had thoroughly perverted whatever idealism there had been. 
Even ‘corrective’ military regimes, by arbitrarily sacking and retiring numerous public 
officers without due process6 only ended up teaching the survivors to ensure their own future 
financial security by fair means or foul. 
 The four-year civilian interregnum of 1979 to 1983 came with a hugely expensive 
system: 19 states7, each with its own executive and legislature, a bi-cameral national 
legislature and a federal executive headed by a President, as well as an army of federal and 
state appointees. The increased numbers of those with access to the nation’s treasuries meant 
even more pressure to conceal what was being done with its oil income.  During this period 
an estimated US$5-7 billion left the country for overseas bank accounts. 
 The introduction of a Structural Adjustment Programme by the 1985-1993 military 
dictatorship of General Ibrahim Babangida caused a plunge in living standards for all salaried 
workers, with a consequent leap in corruption as those in a position to do so recouped their 
losses by extorting money from anybody whose misfortune it was to have to transact any 
business of any kind whatsoever with government. For Babangida, oil wealth was both the 
path and the prize, particularly when the increased income following the first Gulf War 
provided him with even more money. The Nigerian people barely knew enough to realise that 
they were being robbed, and although questions were raised by Financial Times journalist 
William Keeling, as he was a non-Nigerian, the problem was easily dealt with by his 
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deportation8. Babangida therefore had both the funds and the freedom to continue to ‘settle’ 
his critics, and this, coupled with his eight year ‘transition to civil rule’ programme during 
which he continually changed the rules, the goalposts and the players, led to his being 
described as a ruler who had both corrupted democracy9 and democratized corruption. 
 
The Resource Curse 
The next factor is petroleum, discovered in the Niger Delta in 1956. Income from oil had 
increased to such an extent in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war10 that the then military 
ruler, General Yakubu Gowon, declared that his problem was not finding money, but how to 
spend it: a problem ‘solved’ by distributing it among those with access to power – mainly 
unelected military dictators or their chosen civilian successors11.  Despite increased demands 
for resource control by the peoples on whose land or off whose shores the oil is mined, the 
general perception – of not only the rulers, but crucially for the prospects of accountability, 
also the ruled – is that the money the government realises from this mineral wealth does not 
come from tax-paying voters, and thus that it does not come from those to whom account 
must be rendered. Rather, the money accrues from rents and joint venture proceeds paid or 
earned by huge foreign corporations or government agencies. This sense of lack of ownership 
means that on one hand, conditions which might foster demands for openness and 
accountability about government spending failed to develop, and on the other, that the 
income from that mineral wealth has virtually disappeared in a cloud of secrecy, waste and 
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theft. For the most part, it is impossible to say where the billions of dollars earned from oil 
since 1970 have all gone. There is no reconciling the lack of development on the ground and 
the steep dive in living standards with the huge amounts received, while the per capita gross 
national product is less in real terms today than it was at independence in 1960.12 
 The unhappy coincidence that oil revenues began to constitute a major part of the 
country’s income at the same time that it was under the grip of military rule had adverse 
effects for democracy and human rights and of course, for transparency and good governance 
since the fatal combination of dictatorial authority and stupendous oil wealth proved a lure 
too powerful to resist. Nigeria was subjected to either broken promises to relinquish power or 
plots and schemes to seize or retain control by direct means or indirect. 
 
Ethnic Diversity 
The next crucial factor which interplays with the first two to further obscure transparency in 
Nigeria is ethnicity. The country is an artificial colonial creation which officially came into 
existence in 1914. Borrowing Winston Churchill’s description of India, a leading Nigerian 
politician13 said that Nigeria was not a nation, but ‘a mere geographical expression’: that 
there were no Nigerians as such, rather, a myriad of ethnic groups14. One solution to this 
diversity was the federal system of government. However, the existence of so many different 
nationalities and ethnic groups meant that not only was there competition and conflict 
amongst the groups, but that loyalty to one’s particular group often superseded any 
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commitment to the national project. Apart from competition among the different ethnic 
groups for their ‘share’ of the oil wealth, this created a climate in which issues such as 
transparency and openness and the converse qualities of corruption and secrecy were viewed 
and judged through ethnic-tinted glasses, so that any attempt to call treasury looters to 
account was usually drowned in a welter of accusations of selective tribal witch-hunting. 
 
The Civil Service: Colonial traditions of secrecy and self-preservation 
Another factor is Nigeria’s inheritance of the colonial government’s culture of blanket 
official secrecy encapsulated in a series of Official Secrets Acts, which was enthusiastically 
embraced by post-Independence rulers and their civil servants.  Although all Nigeria’s 
Constitutions since independence in 1960 have paid lip service to the right to ‘receive and 
impart ideas and information without interference’15 within the context of a right to freedom 
of expression, what is given with one hand is hobbled by the other. Section 39(3) of the 1999 
Constitution for example, preserves laws that are: 
 
‘... reasonably justifiable in a democratic society – 
(a) for the purpose of preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, maintaining the authority and independence of courts ... 
(b) imposing restrictions upon persons holding office under the Government of the 
Federation or of a State, members of the armed forces of the Federation or 
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members of the Nigeria Police Force or other Government security services or 
agencies established by law.’ 
 
 This ambivalence reflects Nigeria’s history as a former British colony. Not only did 
the colonial government not recognize any duty to make information generally available to 
the colonized people16, it had its own tradition of secrecy characterized by Official Secrets 
Acts dating back to 1911. Independent Nigeria in turn passed its own Official Secrets Act in 
196217 which prohibits the transmission of ‘any classified matter’, itself defined in so 
nebulous a fashion18 that it is hardly surprising that almost any government document can be 
stamped ‘Secret’ for one reason or another.19 
 It is these habits of secrecy that have held sway rather than constitutional provisions 
and international and regional agreements20 by which Nigeria purported to guarantee freedom 
of information and which it not surprisingly took no concrete steps to actualize. 
 While one might hope to find some safeguard or counterpart to the civil service 
culture of secrecy in civil service traditions of loyal patriotism, the corrosive effect of years 
of military dictatorship all but destroyed the latter. And as noted above, arbitrary attempts at 
reform through wholesale sackings and forced retirements in which the innocent were 
punished along with the guilty taught that there was neither security for a public servant’s old 
age nor safety in honesty and probity. 
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Corruption and Lack of Accountability 
These factors combined to bring about a high rate of corruption21, and even after the return to 
expensive22 civilian rule in 1979, this fatal factor had to be added to the already debilitating 
combination of a collapse in oil prices, and an increasing debt profile. This reversed the 
nation’s economic fortunes to such an extent that by 1986 the country was groaning under a 
Structural Adjustment Programme which decimated the middle class and caused an explosion 
in corruption without any economic improvement.  
 Certainly structural adjustment policies created havoc and poverty across the 
continent as many African countries were buried beneath mountains of debt. Yet Nigeria 
ought to have been shielded to some extent from the harsh world economic climate and the 
even harsher World Bank/IMF solutions by its position as the eighth-largest exporter of 
petroleum in the world. But since the early 1970s and Gowon’s infamous description of the 
surplus oil revenue as a problem, Nigeria’s rulers had preferred to treat oil revenue – not as 
necessary resources from which to meet the rising expectations and minimum requirements 
of an increasing population – but as a surplus to be deployed in the quest for political power 
or distributed for private enjoyment. As a result, Nigeria sank lower on all indices measuring 
the quality of life, while the determination of public officials (whose salaries remained fixed 
while inflation rocketed) to maintain their standard of living ensured that it performed 
execrably on issues of accountability, moving for example, from bottom to second from 
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bottom on the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index with monotonous and 
depressing regularity. 
 The 1999 return to civilian rule under the leadership of a President who, in the years 
since 1979 when he had voluntarily relinquished power to an elected civilian government, 
had not only founded the African Leadership Forum at which problems and solutions in 
governance issues were dissected and studied, but had also been on Transparency 
International’s board, did not produce much improvement in this position. Although 
Obasanjo recognized corruption as a critical issue and, at his inauguration on the 29th of May 
1999, promised to make its eradication a cornerstone of his administration, nearly six years 
after he assumed power, Nigeria has done little more than exchange its ‘gold’ medal in 
corruption for ‘silver’ and ‘bronze’.23 
 
Challenging Secrecy 
The struggle to control oil wealth, colonial traditions of civil service secrecy, together with 
long years of unaccountable military rule, particularly as dictators sought to silence 
opposition in order to remain in power and continue to bleed the nation dry, and the 
protective ethnic cordon thrown around any erring member, all combined to create a climate 
of corruption that has been extremely unfavourable to ideas of transparency or freedom of 
access to information. Despite this, the campaign by Nigerians for specific legislation 
guaranteeing their right to access public information is over twelve years old. At the same 
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time, a combination of political competition at home and pressures from outside has begun to 
open aspects of government to public scrutiny. 
 Yet it was not corruption as such that led to the first demands for access to 
government information. Even Babangida had insufficient resources to fill the mouth of 
every critic with enough honey to shut them all up. In any case, the cost of settling powerful 
critics meant fewer resources for other government duties. The unfortunate result in the case 
of the Nigeria Police Force was that the police were forced to ‘live off the land’ through a 
combination of extortion and bribes24. Coupled with a return to and increase in coercion and 
oppression as Babangida struggled to hold on to power, human rights abuses increased 
enormously. Nigeria’s first human rights organisations25 were formed at this time, and it was 
from this burgeoning civil society that the first demands for a systematic right of access to 
government information came. 
 At the same time, other seeds of non-partisan responses to government were being 
sewn. As the succession of one military dictator after another saw increased human rights 
violations and corrupt looting of the nation’s oil income, newspapers and magazines that 
were independent of both government and vested political interests began to provide 
Nigerians with criticism and comment that could not simply be dismissed as the ranting of 
frustrated politicians. 
 
The Human Rights Momentum 
 12
When pastoral visits revealed that most of those in Nigerian prisons were still awaiting trial, 
in some cases for over ten years for vague offences like ‘wandering’, for which the maximum 
punishment would have been a sentence of a few months26, the Civil Liberties Organisation 
(CLO), Nigeria’s first indigenous human rights group, was founded to provide systematic 
assistance to those who lacked means to secure the enforcement of the fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the unsuspended parts of the 1979 Constitution. Although the CLO secured the 
release of many of these prisoners through court actions to enforce fundamental rights, it was 
clear that the problem was both deep and widespread. Sympathetic prison warders might 
unofficially disclose details of detainees, but any attempt to obtain a clear overall picture was 
met with the wall of official secrecy. 
 The haphazard nature of the system into which such unfortunates were thrown meant 
severe overcrowding in all Nigerian prisons, while the fate of those who had no friend or 
relative to bring them additional food and supplies was grim. Between the overcrowding and 
poor nutritional status of many prisoners, it is hardly surprising that disease was rife or that 
there was a high rate of mortality inside the prisons. But again, the CLO’s attempt to get facts 
and figures upon which to build a campaign for better treatment for prisoners was frustrated 
by the refusal of prison authorities to release details of prison deaths. In the event, the CLO 
was able to circumvent prison secrecy by gaining access to the mortuary records where long 
and deeply disturbing lists showed that by far the greatest number of corpses came from 
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nearby prisons, with disease and sickness aggravated by poor nutritional status being the 
primary causes of death. 
 Any attempt to get a nationwide statistics would obviously require details of the 
number and location of prisons, lock-ups and other detention facilities in the country. But this 
was classified information: a matter of national security!  And while it was clear to the CLO 
that prison conditions were a matter of national disgrace rather than national security, it was 
also clear that no useful official information would be released, or indeed, because of the 
Official Secrets Act, could (lawfully) be released. 
 At the same time, the Babangida regime became more and more repressive as it ran 
out of tricks in its long drawn out transition to civil rule programme and public criticism 
heightened. The State Security Service detention cells, so ostentatiously emptied when 
Babangida had seized power in 1985, began to fill up again. Because, apart from the failed 
coup plotters of April 1990, there was little that critics could be actually charged with, the 
junta resorted to administrative detention into which the courts had no jurisdiction to inquire, 
creating another wall of secrecy that human rights activists needed to breach. 
 
Campaigning for FOI Laws Under Military Dictatorship 
A specific campaign for access to information 
The first calls for freedom of information legislation arose therefore because it was clear to 
human rights activists that they could not do their work properly without access to 
 14
government records and information. So in 1992 the CLO began seeking solutions to the 
government wall of secrecy. Because journalists were facing the same problems as human 
rights groups, it was natural for the CLO and the Nigeria Union of Journalists (NUJ) to 
collaborate on the issue. It soon became clear that there was room for an NGO specifically 
devoted to the rights of journalists and freedom of the press27, and this led to the formation of 
Media Rights Agenda (MRA) which then prepared a consultation paper on access to publicly 
held information. 
 Despite the fact that the massive corruption of the Babangida junta was a matter of 
public concern because it was clear that oil money was being used to buy off critics or to 
secure the loyalty of those who could assist in repressing the people, this was the first time 
that specific remedies for the problem had been considered. FOI legislation was conceived 
along with an Ethics in Government Act as part of a twin structure designed to make 
government honest and accountable, but in the event, the latter proved stillborn. 
 
Preparation of a Draft FOI Law 
In 1992, when it was agreed that MRA should spearhead the drive for freedom of information 
legislation, it was anticipated that Babangida would at last hand over to a democratic civilian 
government, and that the climate for the establishment of a more open government would be 
more sympathetic. In the event, the Babangida transition was aborted the following year, and 
Nigeria was plunged into an even deeper abyss of corruption and human rights abuse under 
 15
the Abacha regime, although – like Babangida’s 1985 seizure of power – it was sugar-coated 
at first. 
 Despite the now much less favourable climate, the three organisations pressed ahead 
and a draft FOI bill based on consultations among themselves, suggestions made in 
questionnaires administered to practising journalists, and the experiences of other countries 
was produced. A series of workshops, conferences and seminars was then held to bring in 
more stakeholders, widen the circle of consultation and refine the draft for eventual 
enactment. 
 The next step was to press for enactment, but rather than present the Bill to the 
Constituent Assembly which Abacha had set up to draw up a new constitution for Nigeria 
which they had condemned as lacking credibility, the three organisations instead sent it to the 
Federal Ministries of Justice and Information. It was always recognized that the chances of 
enactment under the Abacha dictatorship were slim, but because the Minister of Justice, Dr. 
Olu Onagoruwa, had been an activist of sorts, and always showed sympathy for human rights 
issues, the Committee met him to press the issue. Unfortunately, the Constituent Assembly 
departed from Abacha’s script when it passed a resolution demanding the end of military rule 
by January 1996, and this washed away the remnants of the regime’s sugar-coating with a 
new wave of repressiveness. In such circumstances, Onagoruwa’s influence within the 
dictatorship (such as it was) evaporated, and with it any chance of his pushing the enactment 
of the Bill as a military government decree. 
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 In any case, shortly after the Constituent Assembly vote, the phantom coup plot which 
led to the jailing of several serving and retired soldiers, including Olusegun Obasanjo, as well 
as civilians burst on the national scene. Amongst the victims was the CLO’s own Executive 
Director, Abdul Oroh28 who, as a professional journalist, had been an energetic advocate of 
FOI legislation. Although Oroh was released after a year in detention towards the end of 
1996, when it became clear that Abacha too had no genuine intention of relinquishing power, 
but had determined to succeed himself as a civilian president29, the struggle to end military 
rule necessarily took precedence. 
 
A Shift from Human Rights to Accountability 
In June 1998 however, Abacha died of a heart attack amid an increasing wave of civil dissent, 
and the regime of General Abdulsalami Abubakar which took over recognized that it had no 
choice but to return the country to civilian rule without delay. Elections were therefore held 
into various levels of government between December 1998 and February 199930, and this 
provided the necessary climate in which to revive the FOI issue, and to review draft FOI 
legislation with which to meet the incoming civilian administration. A March 1999 
conference organized by MRA with participants from both inside and outside Nigeria 
discussed the draft Bill prepared by the MRA, CLO and NUJ, and with the draft then further 
revised in the light of the conference’s recommendations, civil society was ready to hit the 
ground running with the return to civil rule. 
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 The focus of the campaign however, had changed.  Abubakar had gradually released 
all Abacha’s political prisoners, and relaxed restrictions on freedom of expression and other 
civil and political freedoms.  But the revelation of the staggering amounts allegedly stolen by 
the Abacha family meant that transparency concerns shifted from human rights to corruption 
and lack of accountability. 
  
Campaigning for FOI Legislation Under Civilian Rule 
Civil Society: a Proactive Approach 
Obasanjo’s declaration of an all-out war on corruption at his inauguration on the 29th of May 
1999 therefore caught and reflected the national mood of disgust at the extent of government 
corruption, particularly when placed against the increasing poverty of most citizens. Civil 
society organisations felt that their draft FOI legislation fitted perfectly with Obasanjo’s 
objectives. Their position was that rather than preserve the climate of secrecy in which 
corruption could flourish and then pick off only some of the wrongdoers whose crime might 
or might not be punished at the end of a very long day, it would be more effective to make 
the right to receive and impart information real. It was felt that a FOI law would provide the 
necessary ‘disinfectant of sunshine’ that would not only deter much would-be corrupt 
activity, but would also make the detection of any that remained a great deal easier. 
 MRA therefore sent the newly-revised draft Bill to President Obasanjo a few days 
after his inauguration, both to express support for his declared commitment to fighting 
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corruption and to ask him to present the draft FOI bill to the National Assembly as an 
Executive Bill along with his proposed anti-corruption legislation. Such support would have 
been extremely helpful since, as in many other legislative systems, it is bills sponsored by the 
executive that stand the most chance of being enacted.31  Similar letters were addressed to the 
Ministers of Justice and of Information. But the President declined to present the FOI bill and 
instead advised MRA to send the draft directly to the National Assembly.32  Meanwhile, 
several months later the Ministry of Justice got round to advising MRA to:  
 
‘... properly channel your cause through the Federal Ministry of Information which is 
the relevant governmental body that regulates the practice and dissemination of 
information. Your case will be duly considered if it originates from the relevant 
Ministry.’33  
 
Obasanjo: Reaction and Control 
Unlike civil society’s proactive approach, the solution proposed by President Obasanjo to the 
tide of corruption then threatening to engulf Nigeria was reactive. He established a 
completely new anti-corruption machinery in the form of an ‘Independent’ Corrupt Practices 
Commission (ICPC). While few new offences were actually created, the accompanying 
legislation gave the Commission sweeping powers with which it could delve into a person’s 
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life, financial affairs, telephone conversations and correspondence etc. in order to determine 
whether corrupt activity or enrichment was taking place. 
 By the end of the Obasanjo administration’s first term in office in 2003 however, 
there had been announcements of investigations and arrests, workshops and seminars, slogans 
and campaigns, but no convictions. On the one hand the constitutionality of the law was 
challenged by the few people who were actually charged with offences34, and on the other, it 
was soon perceived as a weapon with which the executive branch of the federal government 
was undermining and threatening political opponents both in the federal legislature, and in 
the state governments, but resolutely failing to pluck the beam from its own eye, despite 
reports by both Britain and the United States which were said to have concluded that 55% of 
corrupt activity within Nigeria was traceable to the executive branch of government. 
 The selectively blind Presidential eye that was turned to repeated calls to investigate 
allegations of corruption against one of his predecessors, Ibrahim Babangida, was particularly 
glaring. As with other cases brought to his attention which he had not himself initiated, the 
President’s response was to demand that complainants bring him proof. Given that he 
controlled the entire machinery of state, the police and security services, as well as the ICPC, 
with its extensive powers, this was ‘holding the knife and the yam’, but demanding a dish of 
cooked fufu!  The saga of the Okigbo Panel report underlined continuing government 
determination to keep a tight hold on information that it did not want in the public domain. 
(See Box 1). [Insert Box 1 around here] 
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Legislative Advocacy: Lobbying for FOI Legislation 
Fortunately, after receiving the President’s discouraging July 1999 letter, MRA had not 
waited but immediately set about introducing the FOI bill at the National Assembly. Copies 
of the draft were distributed to some of the legislators, and one of them, Tony Anyanwu, 
agreed to act as sponsor of the FOI bill. Anyanwu secured cross-party support from a further 
24 members who volunteered to be co-sponsors of the bill which was then sent to the legal 
drafting department of the National Assembly. 
 Copies of the FOI bill were sent to all 469 members of the National Assembly, and 
although only one response was received, it was an important one. Jerry Ugokwe replied that 
he was himself planning to present his own FOI bill to the House, as he had become 
interested in the subject when he found himself able to access public documents under the 
American Freedom of Information Act during his studies in the United States. As his draft 
was more or less a wholesale lifting of the US legislation with expressions and references to 
institutions and procedures that had no place in the Nigerian system of law or government, 
harmonization of the two drafts meant that the civil society draft survived largely intact. With 
this, the bill was gazetted35 and had its first reading in the House on the 22nd of February 
2000; the first civil society bill to be presented to the National Assembly. 
 At first there was speedy progress, with the House Information Committee 
undertaking a study tour of the United States and the United Kingdom in order, as they put it, 
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to see how freedom of information legislation functioned in more advanced democracies 
before submitting a report on the 25th of July.36  Even the executive appeared to be coming 
round as the third reading approached, when the Minister of Information made the first public 
declaration of support for the FOI bill by any member of the executive: 
 
‘No state, especially a democratic state, can achieve any meaningful development if 
the citizens do not have access to information about matters that affect their everyday 
life. It is indeed fundamental in any democratic governance.’ 
 
 Although coming at that late stage such support tended only to recall Dr. Johnson’s 
warning on patronage37, in retrospect this belated embrace by the executive presaged 
stagnation and ultimate failure as the entire project fell victim to external politics which, 
despite spirited efforts by a coalition of groups and organisations interested in FOI legislation 
– particularly in the run-up to the 2003 general elections – failed to secure the all-important 
third reading in the House, let alone begin its passage through the Senate.  Members who had 
previously appeared supportive now seemed either indifferent to its enactment, or worse, 
determined to prevent it from proceeding further38. They complained that there had been no 
public hearing, and although when the National Assembly continued to delay because of an 
alleged ‘lack of money’, the MRA raised funds for what turned out to be a well-attended 
public hearing, no further progress was made. 
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A Renewed and Continuing Campaign for FOI Legislation 
Although the subject failed to catch as an election issue, the new session saw the FOI 
Coalition renewing its energy and commitment to the passage of the legislation.  The 
coalition was expanded to include the National Human Rights Commission which undertook 
extensive advocacy with different government departments to sensitize them to the 
importance of FOI legislation, and to answer some of their concerns.   
 Fortunately, the new House of Representatives which was sworn in in June 2003 had 
as one of its new members Abdul Oroh, the former journalist who had been Executive 
Director of the Civil Liberties Organisation and a key advocate of FOI legislation from the 
human rights side of the national discourse. Now he was a key mover in the renewed drive 
for the enactment of the FOI bill, and at the time of writing, the FOI bill had successfully 
completed its passage through the House of Representatives and by February 2005, had had 
its first second reading before the Senate. Indications there are largely favourable, with some 
real enthusiasm and interest being shown by several key members.  
 
Executive Ambivalence 
There is therefore reason for optimism regarding the  prospects for the FOI bill’s passage 
through the National Assembly. The question facing advocates of the bill after that is the 
attitude of the executive. Disturbing signs suggest that despite rhetoric about fighting 
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corruption, the Presidency is in reality lukewarm if not actually opposed to the enactment of 
any genuine freedom of information law in Nigeria. As the third reading approached, 
President Obasanjo gave interviews in which he claimed (wrongly) that the FOI bill was 
mostly imported from foreign countries and failed to take account of Nigeria’s ‘peculiar local 
situation’.39  Obasanjo also complained at the lack of restriction on release of information to 
non-Nigerians, claiming (again, wrongly) that allowing non-citizens access to information ‘is 
not done anywhere else in the world.’  In an attempt to cut this objection off at the pass, the 
bill was amended so that only Nigerian citizens have the right to access information, but in 
practice, there is no limitation on what citizens can do with such information once they have 
obtained it.40 Although the President would be spared the embarrassment of having to reject 
the bill if it failed in the National Assembly, his consent is required before a bill can become 
law, and a presidential veto can only be overcome by a two-thirds majority. The President’s 
comments however, presage a deep reluctance to let control of information slip into the 
public domain. 
 At the same time however, the Presidency has been releasing information about 
government income and expenditure in a way that might suggest a genuine desire to run an 
open and transparent administration. But closer examination shows that only selected 
information has been revealed, and in a manner suggestive of a desire to give the appearance 




It is difficult at this stage – with no legislation yet in place – to offer any final thoughts on 
lessons learned. The present campaign is to have FOI legislation enacted in Nigeria and it has 
not yet been won. While indications from the Senate appear favourable, the experience 
during the 1999-2003 session of the National Assembly, when previously supportive or 
neutral members withdrew their support or even became actively hostile, shows that nothing 
should be taken for granted. Having one of the prime motivators of the FOI legislation as a 
member of the National Assembly has proved of immense value, but the question of 
Presidential/executive opposition is one that will have to be faced sooner or later, since not 
only is Presidential consent required to complete the legislative process, it is ultimately the 
executive that must implement the Act. 
 Planning a strategy is not the same as learning from experience, yet the latter must 
necessarily influence the former. Civil society’s experience to date has been that no 
expectations should be built on the President's history as a former trustee of Transparency 
International, or the founder of the African Leadership Forum. Rather, it is his history as a 
former soldier, accustomed to command and control, as a military dictator and as a key actor 
in the system by which military rulers gained access to Nigeria's wealth and by which they 
maintained control over that wealth, that appears to be shaping his responses. To overcome 
this, the FOI coalition must be prepared to campaign not only at home, but also abroad. Of 
course, organisations such as Transparency International whose regular placing of Nigeria at 
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the bottom of its Corruption Perception Index causes the executive such deep humiliation will 
be important. But with President Obasanjo’s recent emergence as Chairperson of the African 
Union, coupled with Nigeria’s declaration of an intention to submit itself for evaluation under 
the Peer Review Mechanism of the New Economic Partnership for African Development 
(NEPAD), the FOI coalition may have an even more potent lever of persuasion to hand, as 
the existence of FOI legislation in Nigeria would allow the country to present a more 
desirable profile for review. 
 
Prospects for the Future 
At present, only the Evidence Act in Nigeria gives the public access to government 
documents, and even then, this is limited to the context of ongoing litigation. But even if the 
obstacles to the enactment of the FOI Bill can be overcome, that will not be the end of the 
story. Indeed, there are already signs that the passage of any such legislation will only expose 
more of the problems which citizens of the Nigerian state and others like it face in their quest 
for a truly transparent and open government. The tools by which a FOI regime can be made 
effective will still remain in the hands of the executive. And while the Obasanjo 
administration has established some pro-transparency bodies and mechanisms that play well 
on the national and international stages, experience has shown that any departure from the 
presidentially approved script can result in the crippling of such initiatives.41 
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 It is true that since the return to civilian rule in 1999 quite a few windows (or should 
one say ‘peepholes’) have been opened on aspects of the Nigerian government in its attempt 
to appear genuinely open. The Federal Government has, for example, been publishing the 
amounts paid to state governments for themselves and their local governments, is 
participating in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, and publishes details of 
large foreign exchange purchases. Some State governments have also made a show of 
publishing their own audited accounts. 
 But the light thrown on some selected areas only casts those where no voluntary 
disclosure has been made into deeper darkness. For example, when the Federal Government 
started releasing details of the amounts paid to State Governments for themselves and their 
local governments in paid advertisements, some State Governors protested: 
 
‘There is no justification whatsoever for the Federal Government to continue to 
publish the monthly statutory allocations to states and local governments whereas 
Nigerians do not even know how much the Presidency receives.’42 
 
 Certainly the openness about the money paid to other tiers of government is not 
matched by disclosures about the amount collected by the Federal Government, even though 
this is by far the lion’s share of federally collected revenue. Although the protests were met 
with advice to consult the audited accounts submitted to the National Assembly,43 the reality 
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is that even legislators find it difficult to obtain the information they need to carry out their 
duties.  Moreover, given that such information as they were able to glean resulted in a May 
2004 report of the House Committee on Public Accounts that was a damning indictment of 
the waste and corruption within the Federal Government, it is hardly surprising that many 
dismiss the Federal Government’s much-touted openness as peculiarly and hypocritically 
one-sided. 
 No figures are published about how much each of the Federal Government’s many 
ministries, parastatals, departments, units and other agencies receive. An ‘impenetrable fog’44 
shrouds the accounts of the Federal Government and the public can only speculate about the 
billions allegedly spent on federal roads, the National Electric Power Authority and the oil 
refineries with not only no discernible improvement, but in many cases, visible deterioration. 
 The proposed FOI legislation will certainly provide more rights than the Evidence 
Act. But although the FOI bill requires public institutions to keep records, it is here that the 
potential for the most sabotage of the bill’s intentions lies. At present, there is hardly any 
systematic approach to keeping records and statistics. The population of the country itself is a 
matter of guesswork, projection and conjecture. Some junior government officials survive on 
the income they get from being encouraged to ‘find’ files which naturally, are otherwise 
‘lost’. As one commentator observed, one has to engage in ‘virtual espionage’ to secure even 
the most basic information.45 
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 Despite the show of openness made by the Obasanjo administration about the 
financial affairs of others, it shows little appetite for the loss of control over which facts 
become public that a genuine freedom of information regime would entail, as the furore over 
the release by the Acting Auditor-General of the interim audit report for 2001 revealed. (See 
Box 2). [Insert Box 2 around here] 
 Notwithstanding the evident conviction of some key members of President 
Obasanjo’s team about the need for transparency in their individual spheres of government, 
doubts persist about the genuineness of the overall commitment of the federal government to 
relinquishing control over information. For example, while Nigeria has subscribed to the 
global initiative for transparency in the extractive industries, and established a Nigerian 
Extractive Industries Transparency initiative (NEITI) in February 2004, of the 28-person 
National Stakeholders Working Group set up to oversee its implementation, fully half are 
Federal Government employees. The publicity about this Working Group as ‘composed of 
individuals from Civil Society, Media, Government, Indigenous, National and Multi-National 
companies’46 – implies that civil society is a major player in the group, but in fact there are 
just two civil society representatives and only one from the media out of the 28. 
 As a result, there is some feeling that the Nigerian end of the initiative exists because 
of external pressures, and that its purpose is to satisfy those external interests: the 
advertisement in foreign newspapers for an independent auditor will not only perhaps 
produce the best auditor, but will also look good in the eyes of the international community: a 
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welcome harmony – from the government’s point of view – between the appearance and the 
reality.  
 
Attitudes and Habits that Must Change 
Freedom of Information legislation, if it is to be effective when passed, will require a sea 
change in attitude on the part of government. At a crucial moment during the journey of the 
FOI bill through the House of Representatives – which was presenting itself as a champion of 
open government – even a member of the House was refused access to information about 
how the Speaker was spending its budget. The attitude of the executive is hardly better: rather 
there is a deeply ingrained resistance to the release of information to ordinary members of the 
public on demand. (See Box 3). [Insert Box 3 around here] 
 The Okigbo Panel report saga (Box 2) also highlights the effect that a failure or 
refusal to keep proper records can have on any access to information regime. 
 But attitudes outside government equally need to change. The campaign for the 
enactment of FOI legislation has not been a grass roots campaign in Nigeria. While 
proponents of the legislation have mounted a sustained campaign to overcome executive 
resistance to the enactment of the legislation, the inability of federal and state governments 
and law enforcement agencies to secure conviction or punishment in even well-exposed cases 
of wrongdoing has created levels of apathy and cynicism over whether such legislation will 
bring about much change in the culture of impunity and/or immunity. 
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 Much will depend on civil society if FOI legislation is to be transformed from a 
privilege for the elite few to a tool of real accountability in the hands of many. But the 
performance of civil society in using government information remains patchy, and the reality 
is that in all but a few cases Nigerian NGOs have been unable or unwilling to take the 
benefits of free access to information to communities directly affected. The expressway from 
Lagos to Benin becomes well-nigh impassable despite billions voted in annual budgets for 
road maintenance; a newspaper columnist finds a wide gap between claims in the website of 
the Jigawa State Government and the reality on the ground, yet beyond generalized 
complaining, little is done.48 
 Indeed, beyond campaigning for the right of access to information, the extent to 
which civil society has the will or the capacity to make effective use of such information is 
open to question.  Although the civil society representatives involved in the NEITI for 
example, have established a wider support group of CSOs in furtherance of a ‘grass roots 
approach’ there are internal concerns about the lack of commitment and political will within 
civil society to make the best use of even what may be a less-than-perfect system for 
transparency within the petroleum industry. 
 Similar fears must exist to a lesser extent, for the hoped-for more all-embracing 
Freedom of Information legislation.  The slightly higher expectations stem from the fact that 
– unlike the extractive industries initiative – the FOI bill is the result of a local initiative, and 
it is therefore hoped that civil society and the media will make more use of it. Also, while the 
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FOI bill makes it a criminal offence to withhold or destroy information properly requested by 
members of the public, criminal offences under the legislation proposed in support of the 
extractive industries initiative are only for giving false information to the government49; the 
only requirement on the NEITI itself is to publish the auditor’s report on the income from the 
extractive industries.  This situation is bound to create more sense of ownership of the FOI 
bill among Nigerians than of the NEITI. 
 While stories of MKSS in India are repeated to spur FOI advocates on to victory, 
replication on Nigerian soil is as yet rare, although there are a few instances of grass roots 
campaigns, such as that conducted by the Justice Development and Peace Committee of the 
Roman Catholic church which, with its publication of the details of the payments to States 
and Local Governments as revealed by the Federal Ministry of Finance, and its ‘People’s 
Parley’, by which it calls officials to render public account of their stewardship, is trying to 
create a demand for accountability.  
 A great deal remains to be done however, and while it is important to require 
government and its organs to rise to the challenge of making information available to 
citizens, it is equally important to empower citizens to make use of that information. 
 
Overcoming the Military-Civilian Continuum 
As noted above, military dictators who presided over the dissipation and disappearance of 
Nigeria’s oil income continue to cast a long shadow over current attempts to build a 
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democratic government and a functioning and effective transparency regime in the country. 
The current head of state, Obasanjo, is of course a product of the military-in-government 
establishment which has continued to increase in power since 1966. 
 What this means in practice as regards the struggle to secure the passage of FOI 
legislation and its full implementation when passed, is the imperative of recognizing that the 
underlying authoritarian nature of government in the country has not changed simply because 
the key actors now wear agbada50 instead of khaki. Despite its multiplicity of media outlets – 
many of them independent – Nigeria remains an illiberal closed society with an extremely 
fragile democracy. Tightly controlled or brazenly rigged elections are a microcosm of the true 
condition of all the apparatus necessary for a properly and freely functioning democracy, 
whether as regards the legislature, the judiciary or the rule of law: the form and appearance 
are there, but the substance is lacking. 
 Though ridiculed by Fela Anikulapo-Kuti in his song Zombie, military discipline does 
not envisage questions being asked by subordinates. Their duty is to obey orders. To the 
military mind, the debate and argument that are the hallmark of a vibrant democracy seem 
unruly and disorderly. In contrast to pre-colonial Igboland, the ‘other ranks’, or ‘bloody 
civilians’ are neither required nor expected to do other than comply with the instructions of 
the wiser and better heads who have all the necessary information to make the correct 
decisions. 
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 In such a culture, the hostile reaction of the Obasanjo administration to the idea of 
fighting corruption by throwing open everything about government should not be surprising. 
Putting the fight into the hands of the ICPC, which decides what it wants to investigate and 
who it intends to prosecute leaves the executive in absolute control.  Given the numbers of 
former military officers and others who have benefited from their stay in power to win office 
in the present ‘democratic’ system, it may be optimistic to expect any sudden change from a 
closed to an open society. Although in an age of globalisation, a government in a country like 
Nigeria may be unable to prevent all its secrets from being revealed in more open countries, it 
would be naïve to imagine that the openness of such countries within their own borders 
necessarily translates to openness about their dealings with other countries. It does not. 
Moreover, huge amounts of information are not in the international public domain. Oil 
companies for example, may face pressure in their home countries and as a result of the 
global extractive industries transparency initiative of which the NEITI is a part, to reveal 
exactly how much they pay to governments in oil-producing countries. But what records 
would they have of those with direct access to Nigeria’s oilfields and its oil wealth?  
 Beyond even this not inconsiderable last hurdle on the road to the enactment of FOI 
legislation, a little vignette from a letter written to Obasanjo in April 1990 by the man who 
had served him and his assassinated predecessor, Murtala Muhammed, as Secretary to the 
Federal Military Government, Allison Ayida, underlines that the civil service is more than 
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practised at not producing information that the powers-that-be have determined should 
remain hidden. (See Box 4) [Insert Box 4 around here] 
 
Challenges for the Future 
Perhaps the most important lessons will be learned in the future, when the Access to Public 
Information – the FOI – bill has become law in Nigeria. Obvious logistical hurdles are likely 
to present themselves during implementation. But beyond these hurdles lies the battle to 
inspire the people to use FOI as a tool in their own emancipation. In a country where few are 
seen to have been punished for breaches of the law, FOI legislation cannot succeed where 
there exists a civil service determined to resist it and where the citizenry neither feel 
confident that they are entitled to demand accountability from their governments nor that 
there will be any positive outcome from fledgling attempts to call their rulers to account. 
 The challenge before Nigerians in general, and civil society in particular however, is 
to begin to practise using and disseminating information. Even before FOI legislation is 
enacted in the country, CSOs need to cultivate the habit of requesting information from 
government, accessing even information disseminated by government ... and using it. 
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Box 1 
Gulf War Oil Windfall: Vanished Windfall, Vanishing Report 
The gap between increased oil revenues and results on the ground was highlighted in June 
1991, when Financial Times journalist William Keeling was deported from Nigeria by 
Babangida’s regime for suggesting that the windfall from the increase in oil prices caused by 
the 1991 Gulf War had been largely pocketed by top government functionaries. 
 In 1994, the Abacha regime set up a Panel of Inquiry under Pius Okigbo, to probe 
how the windfall had been spent. A summary of the panel’s report revealed that the 
Babangida regime had conspired with top officials of the Central Bank and squandered the 
entire fortune on unproductive or dubious projects. Out of the $12.4 billion Gulf War 
windfall, $12.2 billion had been disbursed, leaving a balance of only $206.037 million. The 
money was frittered away through ‘Dedicated Accounts’ which were not accessible to 
auditors. No further action was taken by the Abacha regime, and the full details of the Okigbo 
Report were not publicized. 
 Almost immediately after Obasanjo was re-elected in 2003, jostling for position in the 
2007 elections commenced. To the consternation of many, Babangida emerged as a key 
contender for the distant contest. His record in office therefore became a legitimate subject of 
concern, and The Punch newspaper sought to obtain a copy of the Okigbo Report. 
Astonishingly, it could not be found anywhere. In November, the newspaper reported that it 
had conducted a two month-long search in all relevant quarters, including the office of the 
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Secretary to the Government of the Federation (SGF), the Department of National Archives 
and the Federal Ministry of Information. None of them could provide a clue as to the 
whereabouts of the report, even though the current SGF had been a member of the Okigbo 
panel. 
 The SGF’s office responded that it was searching for the report, claiming: ‘The report 
is not lost. It is with the Federal Government.’  When journalists asked Obasanjo about the 
report, he claimed to have contacted Okigbo’s widow for a copy. But Mrs. Okigbo denied 
this. She had neither spoken to the President nor had she any copy of the report. The 
President’s spokesperson thereupon denied that the President would have had any cause to 
contact Mrs. Okigbo, maintaining that the report was with the government. But The Punch 
was passed from one section of government to another in its continued efforts to secure the 
report – rounded off by the assertion that ‘those who had authority to see the report had 
access to it’. 
 As the newspaper noted in an editorial published on the 18th of November 2003, the 
Okigbo Panel Report was one of a long line of reports in which public figures had been 
indicted, without anything being done:  
 
‘Not a few Nigerians implicated by these probes still walk tall in the streets as free men, 
while some of them are holding or eyeing sensitive public offices. 
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 The non-availability of a document of such profound importance as the Okigbo Panel 
report is a tell tale clue on the contempt with which officialdom holds the anti-corruption 
campaign. It is tragic that probes in the country scarcely lead to punishment for culprits or the 
furtherance of justice and transparency in public life. The fate of past probes and the reports 
therefrom confirm the painful fact that inquiries have become tools used to divert public 
attention from official corruption, ineptitude and other crimes, or to intimidate and blackmail 
political opponents.’ 
 
For Nigerians the Gulf war oil windfall highlighted once again the fact that as far as those in 
government were concerned, not only would there never be any ‘surplus’ for the Nigerian 
people to enjoy however much increase there might be in oil prices, but that the vanished 
surplus was likely to be applied to maintain in office those who had little concept of 
government beyond personal profit, thus perpetuating the vicious cycle.  
 
Box 2 
The Vincent Azie Saga 
At the beginning of 2003, Vincent Azie, the acting Auditor-General, published an interim 
audit report for 2001. Many thought that at last, here was the first sign that the Federal 
Government was serious about the quest for accountability in government, and consequently, 
about the fight against corruption. Rather than unspecific generalisations about corruption 
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and misappropriation of government funds and property, the report gave specific facts and 
figures about how government money was being misspent, misapplied and misappropriated. 
By making open its insistence on compliance with the rules and regulations regarding 
government expenditure, the report began creating a climate of accountability in government 
circles. 
 The report was particularly welcomed because unlike all previous reports which – in 
so far as the public was aware that the nation’s accounts had been audited at all – would come 
out several years after the funds to which they related had been spent, and the major actors 
possibly long since departed from office, this one covered 2001 and the actions of people 
appointed and still working under the Obasanjo administration. Unsurprisingly therefore, the 
interim report was hailed, with several newspaper opinions and editorials commending Mr. 
Azie’s actions and calling for his confirmation as substantive Auditor-General. 
 Equally unsurprisingly, what had been received with astonishment and delight by 
most Nigerians, caused shock and consternation elsewhere. The Minister of Information 
berated Azie for releasing the interim report before the queries that it raised had been 
answered. But while Nigerians appreciated that such reticence might be appropriate in a 
private company, what they sought from their government was openness and transparency. 
They wanted to see not only the result, but also the process. 
What Nigerians wanted or commended however, proved irrelevant to the Obasanjo 
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government. Having refused to submit Azie’s name to the Senate for confirmation, 
Government wrote to him terminating his appointment as acting Auditor-General of the 
Federation on the excuse that an acting appointment could not be held for more than six 
months. Nothing further has been heard either about the Audit report for 2001, or indeed, for 
any year since, and Azie has since retired. 
 
Box 3 
Declarations of Assets – Another Government Secret 
Section 140(1) of the 1999 Constitution provides: 
 
A person elected to the office of President shall not begin to perform the functions of that 
office until he has declared his assets as prescribed in the Constitution ... 
 
Relying on this provision, MRA and the Human Rights Law Service (HURILAWS) wrote to 
the Code of Conduct Bureau pointing out that Obasanjo ought not to have been sworn in as 
President until he had made the relevant declaration. Receiving the reply of the Bureau that 
the President had indeed declared his assets before a Commissioner for Oaths, the two 
organisations requested a copy of the declaration. But the Bureau responded that there was no 
law requiring the President to make a public declaration of his assets, unless the National 
Assembly were to prescribe such. Upon receiving details of this correspondence, the National 
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Assembly claimed (amongst other reasons) that it was bound by the Official Secrets Act and 
that it could not make a law that derogated from this Act. This of course was an absurdity, 
because the Official Secrets Act is deemed to be an act of the National Assembly, and since it 
was not entrenched in the Constitution47 there was nothing to prevent the National Assembly 
making a law that declarations of assets should be made public, or available to the public. In 
fact in 1999 only one of the hundreds of public officers who took office made the declaration 
of his assets public: the Governor of Katsina State. Meanwhile, when a U.S. estate agent’s 
website revealed Governor Abubakar Audu of Kogi State as the owner of a multi-million 
dollar mansion in the U.S., the value of the property naturally prompted speculation about 
how and when the Governor acquired the property. If after becoming Governor, from what 
funds, given that even a Governor’s salary was insufficient to provide for the purchase of 
such a property?  If before, had he mentioned it on his Declaration of Assets Form?  True to 
form, the Code of Conduct Bureau refused to disclose whether the property had been 
declared by the Governor on assuming office. Even when Audu was not re-elected in the 
April 2003 election and therefore lost his constitutional immunity on the 29th of May 2003, 
the Code of Conduct Bureau continued to protect his secrets. 
 
Box 4 
Allison Ayida writes Obasanjo 
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In 1990, General Obasanjo published a book of recollections of his 1976-79 military 
administration under the title ‘Not My Will’. In a letter dated 1st April 1990 written in 
response to some of the comments in the book, Mr. Allison Ayida, who had served both 
Obasanjo as Secretary to the Federal Military Government [SFMG] exposed the civil service 
capacity for ‘not finding’ documents that might embarrass those in power, even – as in this 
case – for fellow-members of the ruling Supreme Military Council: 
‘When the white paper on the Adeosun Indigenisation Panel report was drafted ... you gave 
me the draft white paper and report for my comment ...  your specific instructions included, 
‘where a Nigerian had acquired the bulk of the shares in any enterprises outside Schedule I, 
the shares should be confiscated’ and forfeited to the Federal Government and the names of 
the ‘moneybags’ publicized. Apparently, you had not studied Volume III of the report where 
names of such shareholders were listed. When I drew your attention to the pages where your 
name appeared, you readily agreed that the panel’s recommendations should be rejected. ... 
When eventually the council memorandum was circulated, we agreed that Volume III should 
not be circulated or published but that you should mention that any member interested in the 
particulars of those who ‘cornered’ the indigenisation shares, should see the SFMG. Several 
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led to civil protests which forced him to make what he called the ‘personal sacrifice’ of 
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 Despite romantic notions back at ‘Home’ about ‘the white man’s burden’, the purpose of 
the British colonial empire was primarily extractive; the amalgamation of 1914 came about 
because although the northern part of the country had to be occupied (to keep the French out 
in accordance with the 1884 Berlin carve-up if for no other reason), the costs of administering 
it outweighed the income, while the income from the southern part exceeded the costs of 
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20
 At their meeting in Barbados in 1980, Commonwealth Law Ministers declared: ‘public 
participation in the democratic and governmental process is at its most meaningful when 
citizens had adequate access to official information.’ 
Article 9 Clause 1 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights makes the 
following provision: ‘Every individual shall have the right to receive information.’  Nigeria 
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enacted the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) 
Act in March 1983, but without any enforcement mechanism. 
 As recently as March 2003, Nigeria signed the African Union Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Corruption which inter alia guarantees access to information.  
21
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Corruption Perception Index for 2003 with a score of 1.4 out of 10; just one point and one 
place above bottom-ranked Bangladesh. In 2004, Nigeria ranked third from bottom, above 
Bangladesh and Haiti. 
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 e.g. by arresting people for spurious reasons and releasing them only when they paid ‘bail’, 
extraction of bribes for every service provided to detainees, accepting money from civil 
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candidate, even though he was not a member of any of them. 
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